In this paper, we extend the state-contingent production approach to principal-agent problems to the case where the state space is an atomless continuum. The approach is modelled on the treatment of optimal tax problems. The central observation is that, under reasonable conditions, the optimal contract may involve a fixed wage with a bonus for abovenormal performance. This is analogous to the phenomenon of "bunching" at the bottom in the optimal tax literature.
Introduction
The agency problem (Spence and Zeckhauser 1971, Ross 1973) has played a central role in the development of the economic analysis of problems involving asymmetric information. Analysis of this problem has produced important insights, but it has also been plagued by technical difficulties and the derivation of solutions that appeared unrealistic in economic terms.
Analysis was initially undertaken in the standard "state space" framework in which random variables are represented by a mapping from a space of states of nature to a space of outcomes. However, Mirrlees (1974) discovered that, if uncertainty is represented by a stochastic production function not exhibiting weak disposability of output and the number of states of nature is finite, the principal can always achieve the first-best outcome. This is done simply by specifying an arbitrarily large penalty if output falls below the lowest level consistent with the first-best effort, and offering the fixed payment from the first-best contract otherwise. Mirrlees (1974) proposed a reformulation of the problem, replacing the stochastic production function with a parametrized distribution formulation, in which the scalar effort variable indexes a family of cumulative distribution functions over a discrete output space. This reformulation permitted the consideration of nontrivial problems, but gave rise to a range of technical difficulties. First, the parametrized distribution formulation is inconsistent with the standard microeconomic framework in which outputs are continuous quantities. Second, some aspects of the solution seem implausible in economic terms. In particular, in the absence of restrictive conditions, it is difficult to preclude the possibility that the optimal contracts will make payments a decreasing function of output over some range 1 (see Grossman and Hart (1983) for discussion on nonmonotonicity). The simplest way to overcome these difficulties has been to assume that output takes only two possible values, or at most a finite number, but this assumption is obviously restrictive. Quiggin and Chambers (1998) argued that the difficulties of the statespace approach were not inherent in the representation, but reflected the unrealistic properties of the technology implied by the use of a stochastic production function representation with a scalar input. With such a technology, observation of output in any state of nature allows a principal to infer the entire vector of state-contingent outputs and therefore to achieve the firstbest. This analysis was extended further by Chambers and Quiggin (2005) to include multitasking concerns. In particular, Chambers and Quiggin derived conditions under which the optimal contract would involve a fixed wage and a nonstochastic output. Quiggin and Chambers (1998) examined a state-contingent representation of the agency problem, deriving a closed form solution for the case of two states of nature. They observed, but did not discuss in detail, the similarities between the state-contingent representation of the agency problem and the optimal tax problem considered by Mirrlees (1971) , and subsequent writers, including Lollivier and Rochet (1983) and Weymark (1986a,b) for the quasi-linear utility specification.
The two-state representation analyzed by Quiggin and Chambers yields a number of useful insights, and is consistent with the standard microeconomic framework. However, like the two-outcome representation commonly used in applications of the parametrized distribution function approach, it is unduly restrictive. In particular it does not permit the modelling of many frequently observed wage contracts, such as that of a fixed basic wage with output-contingent bonuses.
In this paper, we extend the analysis of Quiggin and Chambers to the case where the state space is an atomless continuum. We demonstrate that, in this context, the moral hazard problem, for a single principal and agent, can be reduced to a well-studied adverse selection problem commonly encountered in the optimal taxation literature. In the process, the distinction between "hidden action" and "hidden information," which has led to the requirement for models of moral hazard radically different from those used to model adverse selection, is shown to be inessential. The crucial information asymmetry in this model is that the agent observes the state of nature and the principal does not. If the principal could observe the state of nature, a first-best contract would always be feasible.
More specifically, the approach is modelled on the treatment of optimal tax problems by Lollivier and Rochet (1983) and Boadway et al. (2000) . The responses of agents to incentive structures may usefully be compared to the response of taxpayers to an income tax schedule. The states of nature in the representation of the principal-agent problem proposed by Quiggin and Chambers correspond naturally to the individual taxpayers in the optimal tax problem. However, whereas the social planner in the optimal tax problem deals with a set (possibly a continuum) of agents, each choosing the individually optimal level of effort and consumption, the problem considered here involves a single agent choosing an optimal level of effort and a state-contingent output plan. The state-contingent representation allows for a more flexible response, since effort may affect output differently in different states of nature. But the technological interpretation also raises some technical difficulties regarding sets of measure zero, which are addressed through the use of the Frechet derivative.
The central result is that, under reasonable conditions, the optimal solution involves the specification of a fixed output level and fixed payment to the agent over an interval at the lower end of the state space. Thus the optimal contract may be regarded as a fixed wage with a bonus for above-normal performance. This is analogous to the phenomenon of "bunching" commonly found in the optimal tax literature.
States, Production, and Preferences
We consider a state-space and an associated probability measure µ. For simplicity, we focus on the case of a single state-contingent output. In the discrete case, considered by Chambers and Quiggin (2000) , is a finite set {1. . .S} with elements denoted s, and production involves the transformation of nonstochastic (ex ante) input vectors x ∈ N + into state-contingent output vectors z ∈ Z ⊆ + . Thus, z s is the realized output contingent on the occurrence of state s. General features of the production problem have been considered by Chambers and Quiggin (2000) .
As noted by Chambers and Quiggin (2000) in the case of a discrete state space, the distinction between nonstochastic inputs x and stochastic outputs z is most appropriately interpreted in terms of an ex ante technology. Inputs are committed before uncertainty about the state of nature is resolved. Thus, the input vector is known with certainty, and is hence appropriately viewed as an element of the finite-dimensional space N + . The producer does not know what state of nature will arise, but makes ex ante plans that determine the output in each possible state of nature. There is a natural analogy with portfolio theory. If the payoff from each security can be expressed as a statecontingent vector, then the ex ante purchase of a portfolio of assets generates an ex post payoff for each possible state of nature.
The agent maximizes an objective functional of the general form
increasing in the first argument and decreasing in the second, where y is an outcome space consisting of state-contingent income vectors, that is mappings y : → , and g : N + → is an effort-cost function. Given the ex ante interpretation, an objective of this general form is implied by the assumption that preferences are additively separable over time. We assume that u is concave and twice continuously differentiable.
For the continuous case, we will assume, without significant loss of generality, that is an interval. To simplify comparisons with the optimal tax literature we will make the specific assumption that is an interval of the form [ω ,ω] whereω > ω > 0.
2 State-contingent outputs are given by measurable mappings z : → + , where output in state ω ∈ is denoted z(ω). We will denote the zero mapping by 0.
We will denote the L 2 norm by z and will consider + as an innerproduct space, with the topology of weak convergence. That is, letting
Note that this definition includes all the usual cases of convergence, including that of a continuous distribution collapsing to a point mass, and of pointwise convergence in the space of probability distributions over a (fixed) finite set of outcomes. 2 In the optimal tax literature, ω is a parameter corresponding to the wage. For the quasilinear utility specification (Lollivier and Rochet 1983 , Weymark 1986a ,b, Boadway et al. 2000 , ω is strictly positive. In the analysis of uncertainty, it is conventional to represent the state space by the unit interval [0, 1] . Results presented here can be translated back to this conventional representation with an affine transform.
Input Sets and the Cost Functional
For both discrete and continuous cases, the technology may be characterized by a technology set
The elements of X (z) are the input vectors consistent with the statecontingent output schedule z : → . Most of the properties of X (z) stated by Chambers and Quiggin (2000) for the discrete case depend only on ordering and convexity properties and therefore apply directly for arbitrary state spaces . The only technical difficulties arise with concepts of closure. In addition to the standard properties of convexity and weak disposability, we assume that X is a closed correspondence or, more precisely,
As noted above, closure is defined with respect to the topology of weak convergence.
In any analysis of mappings from an atomless measure space, it is necessary to consider the problems raised by sets of measure zero. In the continuous framework a particular state has zero measure. We adopt the standard notation z = z ae (almost everywhere) if
that is, if z and z differ on a set of measure zero. Note that, given (2), we have
That is, if z and z differ on a set of measure zero, the input set consistent with the production of z is equal to the input set consistent with the production of z .
The Cost Functional
The characterization of the technology in terms of input sets for a given state-contingent technology is general, but not particularly tractable. Given preferences of the general separable form (1), technology may be summarized by a cost functional, c : Z → + ,
That is, for measurable z ∈ Z ⊆ + , c (z) is the minimum cost such that (x, z) is feasible. Thus, rather than considering a set of input vectors consistent with the state-contingent output z, we can confine attention to a scalar measure of cost.
For the case where Z is a finite-dimensional vector space S + , Chambers and Quiggin (2000) analyze the properties of c(z) under a range of conditions. The central focus of this paper will be the derivation of tools for the analysis of the cost functional in the case where Z is of the form + , for a general space , with particular emphasis on the case = [ω ,ω]. The derivation of the properties of convexity, monotonicity and continuity is analogous to that for the discrete case. Given a cost functional c, the objective function (1) may be restated as
Marginal Cost and the Frechet Derivative
As will be shown below, the case of state-allocable linear costs yields a tractable closed form representation for the solution to the agency problem. More generally, if the cost function is differentiable, it may be approximated locally by a linear functional, with coefficients interpretable as marginal costs. In the discrete case, the marginal cost is represented by the derivatives of the cost functional c. For the general case Z = + , the appropriate generalization of the derivative, c ω (z), is given by consideration of the Frechet derivative, which encompasses general measure spaces , including the unit interval with Lebesgue measure and other probability measures as well as discrete state spaces = {1, . . . S} with associated probability measures. The Frechet derivative is attractive because it is applicable to a large class of cost functions c and the corresponding probability distributions over c ω (z). The distribution of cost levels may be continuous, discrete, or a mixture, provided that c is continuous in the topology of weak convergence. In particular, the Frechet derivative is applicable even where discontinuous incentive schemes give rise to jump discontinuities in the distribution of output z.
Suppose that c : Z → is Frechet differentiable, and denote its derivative by c (•; z). c is a linear mapping from ∆, the space of differences in Z , to . Hence, by the Riesz representation theorem, there exists a measure µ c (•; z) (absolute continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure) such that, for any δ ∈ ,
Now we denote the marginal cost of output in state ω by
Observe that, since, for any given ω, c ω induces a mapping from Z to , it is possible to define higher derivatives, cross derivatives and so on. In particular, following the approach of Ryder and Heal (1973) , 4 examining preferences with respect to consumption streams over time, it is possible to use the derivative concept to determine whether outputs in different states of nature are substitutes or complements and, more generally, whether the cost functional is submodular or supermodular in z.
The cost functional c may be approximated in a neighborhood of any z
In the special case of linear costs, the approximation is exact and we have
noting that µ c is independent of z. Hence, the state-specific cost functions are given by
More generally, and treating c (z 0 ) − µ c (ω; z o )z 0 (ω) as a fixed cost c 0 , we may regard the affine cost functional
as a local linear approximation to c in a neighborhood of z 0 .
The Principal-Agent Problem
We now consider a principal, contracting with the agent to produce output z in return for payment y. We assume that the principal cannot observe ω, the state of the world, directly. If the principal could observe the state of nature, the first-best could be obtained as follows. The principal would nominate the state-contingent output z * chosen to 4 Ryder and Heal (1973) do not consider the Frechet derivative explicitly. Rather they define a closely related derivative measure which they refer to as the Volterra derivative, following Volterra (1930) . 5 Note that the "local cost function" does not satisfy the property c(0) = 0 unless c 0 = 0. This does not raise any serious difficulties.
The agent would receive a state-independent payment
provided that the principal observed the agreed output z * (ω) in state ω, and an arbitrarily large penalty otherwise. It is easy to see that this contract is incentive-compatible for the agent and yields the first-best solution to the problem of maximizing the agent's utility subject to a nonnegative expected profit constraint for the principal.
Thus, the crucial information asymmetry in the model is that the principal cannot observe the state of nature, and therefore cannot directly monitor the agent's production of the desired state-contingent output z. The agent, in general, can mislead the principal by producing some z = z, and falsely reporting the state of nature ω and ω where z (ω ) = z(ω). This is a hidden information problem closely analogous to the principal's inability to observe the agent's type in a standard adverse selection problem. The distinction commonly made between "hidden information" and "hidden action" is not relevant, given a state-contingent model of production. If the state of nature is observable, the agent's state-contingent output is contractible, and this is all that is required for optimality.
6
In the agency problem with asymmetric information, the principal must offer a payment schedule of the form y(z), y : + → , excluding dependence of the payment y on the state of the world ω. We will assume that the payment schedule must be piecewise continuous. We do not require that the payment y(z) be nonnegative, thereby allowing for the possibility of sanctions such as dismissal with loss of accrued benefits. However, nonnegative payments can be ruled out by conditions on preferences, for example by requiring that u should display constant relative risk aversion.
Given such a payment schedule, the agent chooses an output vector
The principal's state-contingent profit is given by
6 Note that the principal cannot infer or contract on the agent's choice of input vector x. In general, the set X (z) of input vectors x consistent with state-contingent output z is not a singleton. However, since x does not enter the principal's objective function, this aspect of "hidden action" is irrelevant.
Risk-neutral principals will employ agents only if expected profit is nonnegative. We therefore consider the problem
subject to (4) and the expected-profit constraint:
This formulation is dual to that of Quiggin and Chambers (1998) , where the objective is to maximize profit subject to a participation constraint. Following the arguments of Grossman and Hart (1983) , Quiggin and Chambers (1998) show that, in a constrained-optimal solution, the participation constraint must bind. Given this result, it is straightforward to show that, in the dual problem considered here, the constraint that profit must be nonnegative must bind, and may therefore be referred to as a zero-profit constraint. We record this observation as a Lemma.
LEMMA 2: In any solution to (5), subject to (4) and (6), the zero-profit constraint (6) is binding.

The Agent's Optimization Problem
In order to characterize the agent's optimal behavior, we use some simplifying assumptions that do not involve any significant loss of generality. We will assume that the states have been ordered from worst to best, in the sense that, for any given distribution of output, the least cost z yielding that distribution is monotonic, that is, ω ≤ ω ⇒ z(ω) ≤ z(ω ). More precisely, let
Then for any monotonic z and any z such that
Under this assumption, the agent will never benefit from the choice of a nonmonotonic z in the problems under consideration. Similarly, without loss of generality, we can assume that z, considered as a function of ω, is lower semicontinuous. Now if z and z are monotonic and lower semicontinuous, and z = z, then it cannot be true that z = z a e By confining attention to the set Z * ⊆ Z of monotonic, lower semicontinuous output vectors z, we therefore avoid complications associated with sets of measure zero without any associated loss of generality.
We can also characterize the nature of the agent's optimal output:
LEMMA 3: The state ordering assumption implies, for any monotonic pricing scheme of the form y = y(z), that the optimal response z(ω) is nondecreasing in ω.
In view of Lemma 3, we will assume without loss of generality that z is upper semicontinuous in ω.
Lemma 3 also holds in the Grossman-Hart moral hazard model, where output is a stochastic function of scalar input. We now consider a crucial result which holds generally in the state-contingent model with strictly monotone costs, but only under special and restrictive conditions in the Grossman-Hart model.
LEMMA 4: Let z satisfy (4) 
By strict monotonicity of c , c (z) < c (z), and, since y is nonincreasing on
and the choice of z violates (4).
From Lemmas 3 and 4, we can assume, without loss of generality, that y is a monotone increasing function of z. This in turn implies that it is never rational for the agent to choose an output z if there existsz ≥ z with c (z) = c (z). Thus we can confine attention to the subset of Z * where c(.) is strictly monotone increasing.
We next consider conditions under which z will be continuously differentiable. Since any monotone increasing y can be approximated arbitrarily closely by a differentiable function, there is no loss of generality in assuming that y is a differentiable function of z. Now all that is required is:
ASSUMPTION 1: For all z continuous in ω, µ c (ω; z) is continuously differentiable in ω.
LEMMA 5: Under Assumption 1, and with y a differentiable function of z, any optimal z is differentiable as a function of ω.
We can now show that for any desired output z, the incentive compatibility requirement precisely specifies the feasible incentive structure y(z) on any interval [ω 0 , ω 1 ] for which z is continuously differentiable. We begin by observing that the truth-telling condition (4) requires that, for allz in a neighborhood of the agent's optimal choice of z, [u(y (z(ω) 
which holds if and only if, for all ω and allz in a neighborhood of the agent's optimal choice of z,
Letting z(ω) be the state-contingent output plan desired by the principal, assume that y(z) is arbitrarily negative for z outside the image set {z(ω) : ω ∈ } so that any candidatez must also lie in this range. That is, for anyz and ω there existsω ∈ such thatz(ω) = z(ω). Now we can immediately derive:
LEMMA 6: Let z be continuous. Then (7) holds if and only if, for all ω,ω,
Taking limits asω approaches ω from above and below, we obtain our main result: THEOREM 7: If Assumption 1 is satisfied, the incentive structure y must satisfy
with the complementary slackness condition that either
We will refer to condition (11) as the first-order incentive compatibility condition (FOIC). The requirement that y be a monotone nondecreasing function of ω, or equivalently, that y be monotone nondecreasing in z(ω), which in turn is monotone decreasing in ω, is referred to as the second-order incentive compatibility condition (SOIC).
From (11), the marginal cost of increasing output in a neighborhood of ω, given by µ c (ω; z), must be equal to the marginal benefit, given by u (y (z(ω)))y (z(ω)). This condition may usefully be compared to that derived by Quiggin and Chambers (1998) for the case of two states of nature, where z 2 > z 1 . Quiggin and Chambers show that, under plausible conditions, truthtelling will imply the binding condition
For linear costs, that is, c (z) = π 1 c 1 z 1 + π 2 c 2 z 2 , Equation (12) becomes
which is identical to (11).
In the optimal tax literature, situations where y (ω) = z (ω) = 0 are referred to as "bunching". In the context of the principal-agent problem, the natural interpretation is that of a fixed wage contract, requiring the agent to produce a given output z for all ω in some interval, and not providing sufficient incentive to induce higher outputs for more favorable states within that interval. Ebert (1992) provides a general characterization of the optimal nonlinear income tax with particular emphasis on the analysis of bunching. He shows that, in models with properties similar to those presented here, bunching can only occur at the bottom of the income distribution (see also Guesnerie and Laffont (1984) for a more general formulation of the secondbest principal-agent policy problem, or Boadway et al. (2000) for a characterization of bunching in the optimal nonlinear income tax framework under alternative ability distributions). The emergence of bunching results primarily from the information asymmetry in the principal-agent problem, rather than from details of the principal's objective or the agent's technology, though these may affect the range over which bunching takes place. Given the desire to increase payments in unfavorable states of nature and the capacity of agents to misrepresent that state, it is not surprising that incentives are blunted.
There are two possible interpretations for a solution of this kind. One is that of a fixed wage, with bonuses paid for higher outputs in some subset of favorable states. The second arises when, for low values of ω, z(ω) = 0. That is, in unfavorable states, no production takes place. The solution may then involve a discontinuous jump to a strictly positive level of output z min . In effect, under conditions where the incentive structure would lead the worker to produce less than z min , a separation (fire or quit) takes place. This may involve no payment, a positive separation payment or a negative payment, representing dismissal with loss of accrued benefits.
This outcome may usefully be discussed in relation to the problem of CEO compensation, discussed by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) , who find that CEOs are rewarded for good outcomes, whether or not these can be explained by "luck" (favorable industry-wide trends), but do not tend to be punished for unlucky bad outcomes. The general pattern of remuneration seems to be consistent with that derived here, on the assumption that luck is noncontractible. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) find that rewards for good luck are less significant in "well-governed" companies (such as those with a large shareholder represented on the board), suggesting that in such cases, it is possible to design contracts that are contingent on observable aspects of the state of nature.
An Explicit Solution for the Case of Linear Costs
A useful special case is that of linear state-allocable costs. That is, for each ω ∈ [ω ,ω], there exists c(ω) such that, for all z,
We will assume, without loss of generality, that c(ω) is a nonincreasing function of ω, so that the states are ordered from worst to best. In particular, for the derivation of a closed form solution, allowing comparative statics, it is useful to adopt the normalization
where c is a cost parameter. This normalization can be used to represent an arbitrary c(ω) on by an appropriate choice of the density function f (ω). Following Boadway et al. (2000) , we may now derive the explicit solution for the case of linear state-allocable costs. The main interest is in the reinterpretation of terms from the optimal tax setting to that of the principal-agent problem.
Note that the incentive schedule y(z) can be represented by a set of payment-output bundles (y(ω), z(ω)), one for each ω ∈ , designed to induce the agent to produce the appropriate output at each state. With
Following Boadway et al. (2000) ,
. z(ω) is a natural choice for the control variable in this dynamic optimization problem. The Hamiltonian function is
where λ is the shadow price of the zero expected profits constraint, υ(ω) is the co-state variable associated with
is the co-state variable associated with x(ω) ≡ẏ (ω) and κ(ω) is the shadow-price of the non-negativity constraint on x(ω). We can now derive the solution
where
and
The cumulative values F (ω) and G(ω) characterize the production technology. F (ω) is simply the probability that the unit cost level is greater than c/ω and f (ω) is the associated density. G(ω) is the expected value of c/m over the interval ω ≤ m ≤ ω, multiplied by the probability of states in that interval:
The shadow price of the expected profits condition, denoted by λ, is the expected value of c/m over the entire distribution, E [c/m] and, accordingly, depends only upon the technology.
Let π(z) = z − y (z) denote the principal's unit profit for output level z. For the case when z is strictly increasing in ω (that is, the SOIC condition is satisfied and the first order approach is valid) we obtain, following Boadway et al. (2000) ,
It is worth noting that π (z(ω)) > 0, except at the end points where π (z(ω)) = 0. The optimal contract effectively makes the agent the residual claimant in those extreme states. This is consistent with the result that Quiggin and Chambers (1998) obtain for the best state. However, as noted above, there is no guarantee that the SOIC condition will always be satisfied. When it is violated, the optimal contract involves a fixed wage requiring the agent to produce a given output z for all ω in some interval. Violations of the SOIC can occur at any level of cost and depend only on the technology. However, under plausible conditions, these can be confined to high cost level states. There will be violations at the bottom if ω is small enough (in particular, ω ≤ 1/2G(ω) for any density f (.)). If there is bunching at the bottom, π (z(ω)) is positive at the end of the bunching interval.
Concluding Comments
In this paper, we have shown that, using a state-contingent model of production under uncertainty, the moral-hazard model of principal-agent, for a single principal and agent, can be reduced to a well-studied adverse selection problem commonly encountered in the optimal taxation literature.
Using this approach, we have extended the analysis of Quiggin and Chambers (1998) to the case where the state space is an atomless continuum. The crucial analytical innovation is the definition of a Frechet differentiable generalization of the state-contingent cost function for a discrete case space. In particular, the Frechet derivative may be interpreted as specifying statecontingent marginal costs, even in the case of an atomless state space. This innovation allows the use of tools developed for the analysis of optimal tax problems with a continuum of abilities and quasilinear preferences (Lollivier and Rochet 1983, Boadway et al. 2000) , with the set of individual ability levels being reinterpreted as a set of states of nature with different cost levels.
The central result is that, under reasonable conditions, the optimal solution involves the specification of a fixed output level and fixed payment to the agent over an interval at the lower end of the state space. Thus, the optimal contract may be regarded as a fixed wage with a bonus for above-normal performance. This is analogous to the phenomenon of "bunching" at the bottom commonly found in the optimal tax literature. The fact that results consistent with real-world observation are derived from a simple quasilinear objective function gives some support to the view that the quasilinear form is a reasonable approximation to actual preferences.
In considering possible extensions, there are a wide range of comparative static results in the optimal tax literature that may be extended to the agency problem when it is represented in a state-contingent setting. In particular, Weymark (1987) considers the impact of changes in productivity and in the disutility of labour.
It is natural to consider whether it is possible to translate results in the opposite direction. In particular, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) have shown that, when the state space is sufficiently complex (in their model, it arises from a Brownian motion), the optimal solution for the principal involves the setting of an affine payment schedule. In view of the great interest that has been shown in the derivation of conditions under which an optimal tax scale will be linear or affine, it is of interest to consider whether there are representations of the optimal income tax problem analogous to the principal-agent problems considered by Holmstrom and Milgrom. This issue will be addressed in future research.
